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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of gender in the relationship between labour 
market status and preferences for job security. We hypothesize that the 
insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployment suffers from a gender 
bias. It neither takes the possibility of family-related labour market transitions nor the 
role of the household situation (division of labour, presence of children, dual-earner 
households etc.) into account. We adapt the insider/outsider theory of employment 
and unemployment by incorporating the, on average, higher number of labour 
market transitions experienced by women into the model using interaction effects 
and by conceptualising the household situation as mobility and responsibility effects. 
Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant effect of gender on preferences 
for job security, neither in interaction with labour market status nor as an 
independent effect. In contrast, we observe that individuals living together with their 
partners and main contributors to the household income consider job security to be 
particularly important.  
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Introduction1 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between labour market status and 
preferences for job security. It starts from the seminal work of Rueda (2005, 2007) 
who has shown that an individual’s labour market status has strong effects on 
her/his demand for welfare policies. This is particularly the case for attitudes 
concerning active labour market policies and job security regulations. Most 
interestingly, Rueda observes a cleavage within the group of dependent employees, 
between insiders, i.e. dependent employees having a full-time and permanent job, 
and outsiders, i.e. unemployed people or dependent employees working part-time or 
only having a temporary contract. While the insiders support policies that strengthen 
their position in the labour market, most notably job security regulations, and 
disapprove of policies that strengthen their main competitors for jobs, e.g. active 
labour market policies, the labour market outsiders’ preferences are totally different. 
Outsiders support policies that increase their chances of finding employment, e.g. 
active labour market policies, while they disapprove of policies that reduce labour 
market turnover and therefore the number of open positions, e.g. job security 
regulations. The remaining labour market participants – upscale and self-employed 
respondents – have not much to gain from these policies, but can expect to pay for 
them. As a result, they tend to oppose job security regulations and, to a lesser extent, 
active labour market policies.  
Rueda’s (2005, 2007) theoretical account is very convincing. However, in his re-
examination of the link between labour market status and preferences for job 
security, Emmenegger (2009a) does not find across-the-board empirical support for 
Rueda’s claims. Most notably, the difference between the preferences for job security 
of labour market insiders and labour market outsiders is smaller than expected and 
there is considerable within-group variation in the case of labour market outsiders. 
While part-time and temporarily employed respondents consider job security 
considerably somewhat less important than labour market insiders – a finding in 
accordance with the expectations formulated by Rueda (2005, 2007) – unemployed 
respondents, the archetype of outsiders, consider job security more important than 
any other group examined, including labour market insiders. These findings are 
clearly at odds with the insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployment 
and call for further research.  
Emmenegger (2009a: 135-137) discusses three possible explanations for how this 
result can be explained. Firstly, the classification of labour market participants into 
insiders, outsiders, self-employed and upscales might be too crude and too static 
(Häusermann and Schwander 2009); secondly, the exclusive focus on the labour 
market neglects household relationships and the increasing feminization of labour 
markets (Pierson 2001); and thirdly, the long-term interest of eventually obtaining an 
insider position might induce outsiders to support job security regulations despite 
short-term disadvantages (Tsakalotos 2004).  
This paper adds to this on-going debate by examining one of these three 
potential explanations. In the following, we ‘gender’ the insider/outsider theory of 
employment and unemployment by, on the one hand, theoretically conceptualising 
and empirically testing the relationship between labour market status and gender and, 
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on the other hand, by taking into account the relationship between labour market 
participation and the household situation (e.g. number of persons in household, 
presence of small children and division of work within the household). 
We hypothesize that the insider/outsider theory of employment and 
unemployment, as formulated in its original version by Lindbeck and Snower (1988), 
suffers from a gender bias. Its focus is on full-time male labour market participation 
in highly unionized manufacturing sectors and unemployed workers within these 
sectors. It neither considers the possibility of family-related labour market transitions 
(e.g. due to pregnancy or in order to tend to family needs), the division of household 
labour, nor different forms of non-standard employment, most notably part-time and 
temporary employment.2 However, if we are to understand the preferences for job 
security regulations, we have to acknowledge that in the 21st century almost 50 
percent of the labour market participants are female and that the share of 
nonstandard employment has been constantly increasing in recent decades (see 
Figure 1). In the 21st century, Western Europe’s labour markets are largely de-
industrialized, feminized and characterized by the presence of numerous nonstandard 
employment relationships (Pierson 2001). Full-time male labour market participants 
in the manufacturing sector are all but a small minority group within the labour force. 
In this paper, we attempt to theoretically and empirically capture the implications of 
these developments for the insider/outsider theory of employment and 
unemployment. 
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Figure 1:  Development of Total Employment (% Population), Female Employment 
(% Female Population), Part-time Employment (% Total Employment) 
and Temporary Employment (% Total Employment) in the Period 1980 to 
2008 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics (accessed August 11, 2009) 
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This paper is structured as follows. We start with a discussion of the 
insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployment. Subsequently, we 
discuss, on the one hand, the relationship between gender and labour market status 
and, on the other hand, the role of the household situation for preferences for job 
security. We develop two hypotheses: Firstly, we hypothesize that gender interacts 
with labour market status. More concretely, we expect female insiders to be more 
interested in job security than male insiders while we expect female outsiders to be 
less interested in job security than male outsiders. As we argue, these differences are 
the result of the fact that, on average, women experience more labour market 
transitions than men. Secondly, we hypothesize that the household situation has a 
profound impact on attitudes concerning the importance of job security. More 
concretely, we expect labour market participants not living alone, with small children 
at home and labour market participants who are the main contributors to the 
household income to be more interested in job security than labour market 
participants living in single households, without small children and who are not the 
main contributors to the household income.  
After discussing the employed data and the operationalization of the variables, 
we turn to the empirical evidence. We show that, contrary to our expectations, 
gender does not – neither in interaction with labour market status nor as an 
independent effect – affect individuals’ preferences for job security. In contrast, we 
find significant effects of variables capturing the household situation on preferences 
for job security. Most notably, we observe that individuals living together with their 
partners and main contributors to the household income consider job security to be 
particularly important, while the presence of small children in the household does 
not affect preferences for job security. Analyzing these relationships in more detail, 
we observe that living together only affects preferences for job security in case of 
main contributors to the household income. Simultaneously, an individuals’ role in 
contributing to the household income only affects preferences for job security in case 
of respondents living together with their partners.  
Finally, turning to the macro level, we explore the cross-national differences with 
regard to, on the one hand, differences between respondents living together and 
respondents living alone and, on the other hand, differences between main 
contributors to the household income and equal contributors/secondary wage 
earners. Contrary to our expectations, we find no robust relationships between these 
cross-national differences and policies that are to help reconciling work and family 
life (childcare and family benefits) as well as policies that are to protect labour market 
participants’ welfare (unemployment benefits, social expenditure, employment 
protection legislation and active labour market policies). A final section concludes. 
 
 
Insiders, outsiders and preferences for job security 
 
The insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployment has been 
developed in order to answer an economic puzzle in the 1980s. While the sharp rise 
in unemployment in the aftermath of the first oil price shock had been credited to 
the combination of high inflation and economic stagnation, the persistence of high 
Emmenegger: Gendering Insiders and Outsiders                              9   
 
unemployment confronted economists with a problem. A decline in productivity 
growth due to the rapid de-industrialization had been observed, but wage setters did 
not adjust to the new reality of lower productivity growth (Blanchard 2006: 19). 
Seeking a solution to this puzzle, Lindbeck and Snower (1988) turn to the behaviour 
of labour market insiders because collective bargaining typically takes place between 
a union representing the employed workers (insiders) and firms. The unemployed 
lack representation in such negotiations. Consequently, Lindbeck and Snower (1988) 
call them outsiders. 
Lindbeck and Snower (1988) argue that insiders focus only on their own 
employment and demand wage increases that are beyond the interests of outsiders. 
Thereby, they keep unemployment above the natural rate. Firms have the option of 
replacing their employees with unemployed workers – or can use the threat of hiring 
currently unemployed workers to negotiate lower wages with trade unions. However, 
this threat’s credibility is a function of labour turnover costs, i.e. the cost of replacing 
employed workers. These costs are a function of several factors, but the most 
important sources of labour turnover costs are job security regulations (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1988: 3).  
Labour market insiders gain from low labour turnover and high labour turnover 
costs respectively. It is crucial that both are strongly influenced by job security 
regulations, i.e. labour turnover is low and the cost of labour turnover is high when 
job security regulations are very strict. As a consequence, a distinction between 
insiders and outsiders is necessary because these two groups have opposing 
preferences with regard to job security regulations. While job security regulations 
increase the insiders’ market power vis-à-vis their firm, they also constitute a barrier 
to entry for labour market outsiders (Saint-Paul 2002; Emmenegger 2009a).  
The group of insiders does not include all those currently working. There are 
also other groups such as the self-employed and the so-called ‘upscales’, who are 
employees in privileged positions in the labour market. The former are not subject to 
collective bargaining, while the ‘upscales’ occasionally are. However, due to their 
human and social capital the ‘upscales’ do not need to be afraid of unemployment. 
Consequently, they cannot be expected to support social policy interventions. Quite 
the contrary, due to their privileged position in the labour market, they have to 
expect to carry a disproportionate part of the costs of social policy interventions. As 
far as the self-employed are concerned, protection against dismissals is for obvious 
reasons useless.  
Similarly, workers with temporary contracts and workers involuntarily confined 
to part-time jobs cannot be classified as insiders. The majority of these jobs pay 
poorly and are concentrated in low-skills sectors (Rueda 2005: 63). Consequently, 
Rueda classifies part-time and temporarily employed as outsiders. Job security 
regulations are of little use to temporary workers. They cannot expect to work for the 
same enterprise for the rest of their lives. They have a fixed-term contract and as 
soon as this contract expires they will either get a new contract or leave, independent 
of job security regulations. Although they may hope to get a permanent contract one 
day, the present value of job security regulations, at least in the short term, is very 
low. Part-time jobs are often less protected by job security regulations than full-time 
jobs (Samek Lodovici 2000: 38). Per definition, involuntary part-time work implies 
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that these workers would like to switch to a full-time job if possible. However, 
according to the insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployment, it is 
exactly the existence of restrictive job security regulations that decreases their chance 
to do so. As a result, they cannot be expected to support restrictive job security 
regulations.  
The situation is more complicated in the case of currently employed workers 
with a recent history of unemployment. Due to their recent transition back into 
employment, they might appreciate flexible labour markets. Moreover, their history 
of unemployment can be understood as an indicator of a comparatively weak labour 
market attachment. As a result, their risk of becoming unemployment again might be 
disproportionally high. However, now that they are employed again, they benefit 
from restrictive job security regulations. As argued by Esping-Andersen (1999: 136), 
job security regulations provide a shelter for those already employed, even the low-
skilled ones and those with a weak labour market attachment. Moreover, their higher 
risk of becoming unemployed increases the short-term value of job security 
regulations (Emmenegger 2009c).  
It is important to note that the insider/outsider theory of employment and 
unemployment does not claim that labour market outsiders support labour market 
deregulation. Nonetheless, significant differences between labour market insiders and 
labour market outsiders in terms of preferences for job security regulations can be 
expected. This is due to the fact that the difference between labour market insiders 
and labour market outsiders is a relative one. Labour market insiders have a very 
clear and rational interest in more restrictive job security regulations (they want to 
keep their current jobs). In contrast, the situation is less clear for labour market 
outsiders. Thus, we need not assume that outsiders openly support the deregulation 
of job security regulations in order to observe relative differences between labour 
market insiders and labour market outsiders. It is sufficient to assume that labour 
market insiders have a stronger (and more visible) interest in job security regulations. 
 
 
Gendering insiders and outsiders 
 
Job security regulations have been identified as an important form of social 
protection by leading welfare state scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1999), Bonoli 
(2003) and Kaufmann (2003). As all forms of social protection, job security 
regulations have distributional effects. According to the insider/outsider theory of 
employment and unemployment, job security regulations have negative distributional 
consequences for labour market outsiders. This, however, is not the only 
distributional consequence. Especially Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999) has forcefully 
argued that job security regulations also affect the relative position of men and 
women in the labour market. In the following, we will gender the insider/outsider 
theory of employment and unemployment by taking into account the additional life-
course risks women face and their more precarious labour market positions (Svallfors 
1997) as well as by integrating the household situation in order to go beyond the 
mere distinction between different labour market states.  
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Women and men are different. Women are more likely to interrupt their working 
life in order to tend their family’s needs (Estevez-Abe 2005: 190). Some of these 
interruptions are due to biology: women give birth to children while men do not. 
However, there are also other reasons. Women tend to undertake a bigger part of the 
household labour because a considerable number of citizens of Western societies 
consider this to be the ‘natural’ division of labour. As a result, women tend to spend 
more time away from paid work than men. Put differently, on average, women 
experience more labour market transitions than men. The important point here is 
that the higher number of labour market transitions increases the importance of 
institutions regulating these transitions, e.g. job security regulations. 
Although not all women experience more career breaks than men, employers 
assume that this is the case. This phenomenon is often referred to as ‘statistical 
discrimination’. Independent of women’s actual career intentions, employers tend to 
adjust their employment policies in order to anticipate that women are on average 
more likely than men to quit their jobs. Statistical discrimination has an effect on all 
women independent of their skills. There is no personal characteristic that makes 
women insulated from statistical discrimination. Rather, it is the mere fact that they 
are women that weakens their labour market position. As a result, all women are 
treated as if they experience more labour market transitions.  
We hypothesize that gender can be expected to exacerbate the differences 
between insiders and outsiders. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, due to 
additional life-course risks, women experience more transitions from unemployment 
to employment and vice versa. As a result, institutions mediating these transitions, 
such as job security regulations, become more important. Secondly, the transition 
from unemployment to employment is more difficult for women than for men due 
to statistical discrimination. If two equally qualified candidates apply for the same 
job, employers will pick the male candidate because they can expect male workers to 
remain with the firm for a longer period than female workers. As a consequence, 
female outsiders are particularly likely to suffer from the negative labour market 
effects of job security regulations. Thirdly, job security regulations are particularly 
beneficial for labour market participants in a weak labour market position 
(Emmenegger 2009c). As noted above, female insiders are on average in a weaker 
labour market position than male insiders. As a result, we expect female insiders to 
be more supportive of job security regulations than male insiders.  
Thus, we expect gender to exacerbate insider/outsider divisions: On the one 
hand, female outsiders can be expected to be even more critical of labour market 
institutions that complicate their return to an insider position. They experience more 
often the transition from unemployment to employment than men. Moreover, due to 
statistical discrimination, this transition is more difficult. On the other hand, the 
more precarious labour market positions of women makes job security regulations 
particularly valuable to female insiders as they face a higher risk of unemployment 
than their male counterparts. As they are exposed to a higher risk of joblessness, they 
will be more supportive of any institution that protects their currently favourable 
position. Figure 2 displays the relationship graphically. 
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Figure 2: Preferences for Job Security by Labour Market Status and Gender 
 
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that due to more frequent career interruptions 
women prefer (and are better off in) less regulated labour markets (Estevez-Abe 
2005). Since the main sources of these career interruptions are pregnancy and 
childbirth, this argument ignores that all Western democracies know employment-
protected statutory maternity leave arrangements that prohibit the dismissal of 
women during and immediately after pregnancy (OECD 2007: 122, 126). As a result, 
currently employed women do not need to worry about being dismissed due to 
pregnancy. Rather, the existing job security regulations protect their positions as 
insiders even during these periods. As a result, job security regulations become even 
more valuable to insider women. 
The number of not work-related labour market transitions is a function of the 
ability to reconcile work and family life. Especially, childcare facilities have been 
identified as particular important instruments to reconcile work and family life. The 
availability of free or reasonably priced childcare allows women to work in the labour 
market while freeing them, at least to a certain extent, from spending the main bulk 
of their working time on child-rearing. Thus, rather than spending a big part of their 
time for family work, childcare allows women to pursue a career as full-time 
employees in the labour market. Not surprisingly, countries characterized by high 
levels of publicly provided childcare tend to exhibit higher levels of female 
employment (Stadelmann-Steffen 2008). Thus, the presence of childcare facilities 
decreases the number of not work-related labour market transitions. As a result, 
career patterns of men and women would become more alike, and, as a consequence, 
also their preferences for job security regulations. Consequently, we expect female 
insiders (outsiders) to be particularly interested (uninterested) in job security in 
countries with low levels of childcare coverage. In contrast, we expect smaller 
differences between female and male insiders (outsiders) in countries with high levels 
of childcare coverage.  
Childcare is not equally important for all women. Even if childcare is not 
provided free of charge by the state, it can still be bought in the private market. Thus, 
it is not the availability per se that matters but the availability of free or reasonably priced 
childcare. Better-off women are in a good position to reconcile work and family life 
because they can buy the necessary services in the labour market in order to regain 
the ability to pursue a largely uninterrupted working career (Stadelmann-Steffen 
2007). Thus, no relationship between the existence of free childcare and the labour 
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market preferences of female upscale respondents can be expected. In contrast, free 
or reasonably priced childcare is very important for the labour market situation of 
female labour market insiders and female labour market outsiders. The easier these 
women can reconcile work and family life, the more their labour market preferences 
will resemble the preferences of their male counterparts.  
The household situation is an often-overlooked determinant of labour market 
preferences (Lewis 1992). As the division of household labour is not randomly 
distributed among men and women, the household situation is likely to influence the 
relative preferences for job security among men and women. In the following, we 
distinguish two different effects: responsibility and mobility. Respondents with the 
responsibility to provide for the economic livelihood of their family can be expected 
to be strongly interested in social policy interventions that increase their job security 
(Erlinghagen 2008). In case of job loss, not only her or his economic situation is in 
question, but the whole family’s welfare. The situation is quite different in case of 
respondents who can rely on working partners and who are not the main 
contributors to the family income. These respondents, if they work at all, can be 
expected to be less interested in job security since their partners serve as an insurance 
against welfare loss in case of unemployment. Thus, we expect main contributors to 
the household income to support job security regulations while respondents with 
working partners can be expected to be comparatively critical of job security 
regulations.  
In a recent contribution, Neugart (2008) has argued that in countries 
characterized by high levels of job security regulations and low levels of female 
employment, family members other than the male breadwinner support high levels 
of job security regulations because their economic welfare is dependent on the 
income of the main earner. Put differently, the whole family’s economic security is a 
function of the main earners’ job security. As a result, many female secondary wage 
earners adopt the social policy preferences of their male breadwinners. In a similar 
vein, Hakim (1995) has argued that some female outsiders may choose their outsider 
position voluntarily. Formerly full-time workers, they transfer quickly to 
undemanding part-time jobs as soon as a breadwinning spouse facilitates it. As in 
Neugart’s account, these secondary wage earners can be expected to adopt their male 
breadwinners’ social policy preferences. Other authors have criticized this view. 
These authors interpret the relationship between marriage partners as the result of 
bargaining under constraints. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) argue that considering 
contemporary divorce rates, the simplifying assumption of treating the family as a 
single unit is no longer warranted. These authors argue that there is a considerable 
conflict of interests between marriage partners, which is likely to affect preferences 
for social protection.  
We follow Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) and maintain that secondary wage 
earners living together with a full-time working partner (the main contributor to the 
household income) can be expected to develop their own social policy preferences. 
Firstly, labour market participation is likely to affect the social policy preferences of 
secondary wage earners, as their objective labour market position is different from 
their full-time working partners. So are the problems associated with their objective 
labour market position.3 Secondly, it is not per se clear why secondary wage earners 
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should take over the social policy preferences of their full-time working partners. It is 
equally possible that the latter adopt the social policy preferences of their not full-
time working partners, especially considering the latter’s often weaker labour market 
positions. Consequently, it can be expected that some of these effects cancel each 
other out. Thirdly, considering contemporary divorce rates secondary wage earners 
living in a steady relationship can no longer expect to spend the rest of their lives 
with their partner. As a result, these secondary wage earners need an independent 
source of economic security. 
The household situation is also very likely to affect respondents’ mobility 
preferences. Marital status is strongly related to the probability of establishing 
residence and home ownership. Once settled, the willingness to move diminishes. As 
a result, married respondents can be expected to be less mobile (or willing to be 
mobile) and, consequently, to be more interested in labour market policies that 
decrease the probability of moving homes such job security regulations (Schmid 
2002: 408; Belot 2007). It is important to note that mobility preferences and the 
responsibility to provide for the economic livelihood of the household are not 
independent. Respondents not living in steady relationships (i.e. mobile respondents) 
are also very likely the main contributors to the household income. 
The presence of small children in the household can be expected to influence 
both perceived responsibility and mobility preferences. On the one hand, the 
presence of children increases the number of individuals that are economically 
dependent on the income of the main earner. Put differently, the presence of small 
children increases the economic costs of job loss. On the other hand, the presence of 
children increases the costs of mobility as more household members would have to 
be moved and more social networks would have to be severed.  
 
            
    Small children in household? 
(Mobility and responsibility) 
    Yes No 
 
Yes 
Main earner? Yes +++ ++ 
Steady relationship? (responsibility) No ++ + 
(mobility) 
No 
Main earner? Yes ++ + 
 (responsibility) No + 0 
            
      
Table 1: Preferences for Job Security as a Function of Household Situation 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the argument. Respondents can be expected to support high 
levels of job security regulations if they are in a steady relationship (high mobility 
costs) and the main income earners (high levels of responsibility) as well as if there 
are small children in the household (high mobility costs and high levels of 
responsibility). In contrast, respondents can be expected to be critical of job security 
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regulations if they are not in a steady relationship and not the main contributor to the 
household income, and if there are no small children in the household. 
 
Social policy institutions are likely to influence perceptions of responsibility. The 
presence of generous unemployment benefits (or other forms of social insurance) 
decreases the family’s economic dependency on the main income earner’s job. In 
case of job loss, the income of the main earner is replaced by generous 
unemployment benefits. This argument reflects claims of a trade-off between the 
generosity of unemployment insurance and job security regulations (Boeri et al., 
2003; Iversen 2005: 46-52). Scholars in this tradition argue that the presence of 
generous unemployment insurance systems decreases the importance of job security 
regulations as a form of social protection. As a result, support for job security 
regulations is likely to drop. Similarly, generous family benefits provide a source of 
income independent of the main income earner’s job. This additional income can be 
expected to at least partially alleviate the financial cost of having children. In the 
presence of generous family benefits, perceptions of responsibility for the economic 
welfare of children in the household should be weaker than in the absence of 
generous family benefits. As a result, support for restrictive job security regulations 
among respondents with small children should decrease as family benefits become 
more generous. Finally, policies that help reconciling work and family life simplify 
the ‘sharing of the burden’ in the sense of helping the secondary wage earner to 
increase her/his labour market participation in case of economic need.  
With regard to mobility costs, we expect cross-national differences to be affected 
by the presence of active labour market policies (Schmid 2002: 408). These policies 
aim at supporting the mobility of labour market participants by providing 
information on open jobs and training for unemployed labour market participants as 
well as financially supporting the relocation of labour market participants to places 
characterized by more favourable labour market developments. Supporting the 
mobility of labour market participants through active labour market policies (ALMP) 
has a long tradition in Sweden, where they are a central element of the famous Rehn-
Meidner model. As noted by Armingeon (2007: 906), ALMP was originally 
developed as part of the social democratic strategy of merging competitiveness of an 
open economy with the security of full employment and social justice. However, 
ALMP have become accepted by liberal and conservative politicians and economists 
alike. Nevertheless, considerable cross-national differences in the employment of 
ALMP can be observed. While Scandinavian countries spend around two percent of 
GDP on ALMP in the late 1990s, spending on ALMP is almost zero in countries 
such as Greece or the Great Britain (see Table 8 below). 
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Empirical part 
 
Individual level data and variables 
 
The present analysis relies on the Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001) survey. This survey 
supplies complementary information on preferences for job security and individual 
attributes. Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001) contains data on 15 countries of interest, 
corresponding to the EU15. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.4 The employed survey contains several 
variables of interest. Most importantly, respondents have been asked to evaluate the 
importance of job security. Following Rueda (2005, 2007), we operationalize 
preferences for job security using the following question: ‘For you personally, how 
important do you think each item is in choosing a job: A secure job?’ Respondents 
were offered five possible answers ranging from 1 (‘not important at all’) to 5 (‘very 
important’). This question is very general (Kangas 1997), but it has the advantage of 
not making any references to other policy fields.5 Non-employed respondents have 
not been asked to evaluate job security. As Table 2 shows, this variable is skewed, 
that is, over 90 percent of the respondents opted for the highest two categories (‘very 
important’ and ‘important’ respectively). 
 
         
     
Very important 3346  56.14%  
     
Important 2242  37.62%  
     
Neither important nor unimportant 240  4.03%  
     
Not important 111  1.86%  
     
Not important at all 21  0.35%  
     
N 5960  100.00%  
       
     
Table 2: Importance of Job Security in Choosing a Job: Frequencies 
 
 
Labour market status has been operationalized using the question: ‘What is your 
current occupation?’ Eurobarometer 56.1 distinguishes between self-employed 
respondents, managers (employed professionals, general and middle management), 
other white-collar respondents (working mainly at a desk and/or travelling), manual 
workers (service jobs, supervisors, skilled and unskilled manual workers), 
housekeepers, unemployed and retired (retired and/or unable to work through 
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illness) respondents as well as students. Other questions allow distinguishing 
permanent from temporarily employed and full-time from part-time employed 
respondents. We define labour market insiders as full-time employees under 
permanent contract that do not occupy a position in the general management and are 
not employed professionals. The latter have been coded as ‘upscales’. Outsiders are 
employees that are working part-time, under a temporary contract or are currently 
unemployed. Note that there are no part-time and/or temporarily employed 
respondents that occupy a higher-grade professional or managerial position in the 
sample. Housekeepers, retired respondents and students have not been coded as 
outsiders since the large majority of them may be neither interested in a new job nor 
able to accept one. As such, they are no competition to labour market insiders. 
Rather, they form an own category (non-employed respondents). The last group are 
the self-employed. Note that all five groups are exclusive, that is, no respondent has 
been classified into more than one group.  
As noted above, people currently not working have not been asked to evaluate 
the importance of job security. As a result, the group referred to as ‘non-employed’ 
above has been omitted from the sample. Moreover, unemployed respondents are 
not taken into account in the quantitative analysis below. As a consequence, the 
group of labour market outsiders only incorporates respondents in non-standard 
employment relationships (part-time and temporary employment). Finally, there are 
only very few respondents which have been classified as upscales. This could lead to 
estimation problems in some countries. Therefore, we merge the groups of ‘self-
employed’ and ‘upscale’ respondents. Henceforth, we refer to ‘upscale’ and ‘self-
employed’ respondents both as ‘upscales’ (see Rueda 2005 for a similar approach).  
The operationalization of gender is straightforward. The household situation has 
been measured using three survey questions. Firstly, respondents who contribute the 
main part to the household income have been classified as ‘main earners’ while 
respondents who contribute the smaller part to the household income have been 
classified as ‘secondary wage earners’. We use respondents that contribute equally 
with their partners to the household income as reference category. Secondly, family 
responsibilities have been further operationalized by a dummy variable for 
respondents with children below the age of five years. Finally, a dummy variable for 
married respondents and respondents who live in steady relationships has been used 
to operationalize mobility preferences.  
We further introduce a battery of control variables. These variables are: (1) age 
and its square, (2) education, operationalized as a dummy variable for respondents 
who were still studying at the age of 20 or more and (3) a dummy variable for 
respondents that made the experience of unemployment in the last five years. To 
estimate the models, we use ordered logit regression with country fixed effects. The 
models are interpreted using SPost by Long and Freese (2006). 
 
Individual level empirical evidence 
 
Table 3 displays the results of ordered logit regressions of preferences for job 
security on variables measuring labour market status, gender, the household situation 
and controls. Model 1 only incorporates variables measuring labour market status 
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and controls. Model 2 further incorporates a gender dummy variable. As can be seen 
in Table 3, in both models, upscale respondents consider job security to be less 
important in choosing a job. In contrast, the difference between labour market 
insiders and outsiders ceases to be significant once a control for gender is included. 
This result echoes the findings of Emmenegger (2009a) who observes that the 
preferences for job security of labour market insiders and labour market outsiders are 
more similar than one is inclined to expect on the basis of the insider/outsider theory 
of employment and unemployment.  
         
Dependent variable: Importance of job security 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Upscales -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.41** 
 (-4.8)    (-5.0)    (-5.0)    (-3.0) 
Insiders 0.16*   0.14    0.12    0.16 
 (2.3)    (1.9)    (1.7)    (1.3) 
Outsiders Reference category 
     
Gender (woman = 1) - -0.07    0.03    0.07 
  (-1.3)    (0.4)    (0.5) 
Upscales x gender (woman = 1) - - - -0.02 
    (-0.1) 
Insiders x gender (woman = 1) - - - -0.06 
    (-0.4) 
Age  -0.02    -0.02    -0.04**  -0.04** 
 (-1.6)    (-1.6)    (-2.7)    (-2.7) 
Age2 0.00    0.00    0.00*   0.00* 
 (1.4)    (1.4)    (2.3)    (2.3) 
History of unemployment -0.13    -0.13    -0.11    -0.11 
 (-1.8)    (-1.8)    (-1.5)    (-1.5) 
Highly educated -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.41*** -0.41*** 
 (-7.2)    (-7.2)    (-7.1)    (-7.1) 
Living together - - 0.25*** 0.25*** 
   (3.7)    (3.7) 
Main contributor to family income - - 0.29**  0.28** 
   (2.9)    (2.9) 
Secondary wage earner - - 0.11    0.11 
   (1.1)    (1.1) 
Equal contributors to family income Reference category 
     
Child below five years - - 0.00    0.00 
   (0.0)    (0.0) 
FE: Belgium Reference category 
     
FE: Denmark -0.88*** -0.88*** -0.89*** -0.89*** 
 (-6.5)    (-6.5)    (-6.6)    (-6.6) 
FE: Germany (West) -0.30*   -0.30*   -0.30*   -0.30* 
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 (-2.1)    (-2.1)    (-2.0)    (-2.1) 
FE: Greece 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 
 (3.9)    (3.9)    (3.8)    (3.8) 
FE: Italy -0.18    -0.18    -0.14    -0.13 
 (-1.3)    (-1.2)    (-0.9)    (-0.9) 
FE: Spain 0.12    0.12    0.15    0.15 
 (0.8)    (0.8)    (1.0)    (1.0) 
FE: France -0.20    -0.20    -0.20    -0.20 
 (-1.4)    (-1.4)    (-1.4)    (-1.4) 
FE: Ireland -0.66*** -0.66*** -0.65*** -0.65*** 
 (-4.6)    (-4.6)    (-4.5)    (-4.5) 
FE: Luxembourg -0.03    -0.03    -0.04    -0.04 
 (-0.2)    (-0.2)    (-0.3)    (-0.3) 
FE: Netherlands -1.10*** -1.10*** -1.12*** -1.12*** 
 (-7.7)    (-7.7)    (-7.8)    (-7.8) 
FE: Portugal -0.77*** -0.77*** -0.78*** -0.78*** 
 (-5.5)    (-5.4)    (-5.5)    (-5.5) 
FE: Great Britain -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.52*** 
 (-3.6)    (-3.6)    (-3.6)    (-3.6) 
FE: Finland 0.10    0.11    0.13    0.13 
 (0.7)    (0.7)    (0.9)    (0.9) 
FE: Sweden -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.54*** 
 (-4.0)    (-4.0)    (-4.0)    (-4.0) 
FE: Austria -0.08    -0.08    -0.06    -0.06 
 (-0.6)    (-0.5)    (-0.4)    (-0.4) 
     
cut1     
Constant -6.76*** -6.81*** -6.73*** -6.71*** 
 (-18.5)    (-18.6)    (-17.7)    (-17.4) 
cut2     
Constant -4.89*** -4.94*** -4.86*** -4.84*** 
 (-16.1)   (-16.1)    (-15.1)    (-14.7) 
cut3     
Constant -3.79*** -3.84*** -3.76*** -3.74*** 
 (-12.8)    (-12.9)    (-12.0)    (-11.7) 
cut4     
Constant -1.22*** -1.27*** -1.19*** -1.16*** 
 (-4.2)    (-4.3)    (-3.8)    (-3.7) 
Pseudo R2 0.036    0.037    0.039    0.039 
Log likelihood -5256.2    -5255.4    -5245.1    -5245.1 
No. of observations 5960    5960    5960    5960 
          
 
Table 3: Determinants of the Importance of Job Security in Choosing a Job 
 
Notes: Ordered logit regressions with country fixed effects, z-values in parentheses.  
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
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In the present paper, we are particularly interested in investigating whether 
respondents’ gender might help explaining this apparent contradiction between 
theory and empirical evidence. As displayed in Table 3’s Model 2, gender does not 
have a significant net effect on attitudes concerning the importance of job security in 
choosing a job. The LR test statistic is 1.60 (df = 1, p-value = 0.206). This 
relationship remains insignificant even when the dependent variable is dichotomized, 
thereby distinguishing between respondents considering job security very important 
and everybody else, and logit regressions are estimated (z-value of -1.78; results not 
reported). As we argue above, this finding is not surprising as gender can be expected 
to have diametrically opposed effects on labour market insiders and labour market 
outsiders. Moreover, we expect the household situation to affect preferences of 
female and male respondents differently.  
As a consequence, we first incorporate the four dummy variables measuring the 
household situation (Model 3 in Table 3). The incorporation of variables measuring 
the household situation clearly increases the explanatory power of the model. 
Comparing Model 3 to Model 2 (Table 3), the LR test statistic is 20.58 (df = 4, p-
value = 0.000). More concretely, respondents who contribute the main part to the 
household income and respondents living together with partners consider job 
security to be more important in choosing a job than equal contributors to the 
household income and respondents not living together with their partners. In 
contrast, secondary wage earners are not less concerned with job security than equal 
contributors to the household income. Finally, the presence of small children does 
not affect preferences for job security. Turning back to the dummy variable 
measuring gender, Table 3’s Model 3 shows that gender remains insignificant (z-value 
of 0.44).  
In a next step, we introduce an interaction between gender and labour market 
status (see Model 4 in Table 3). The interpretation of interaction effects is 
fundamentally different in generalized linear models (such as ordered logit models) as 
compared to linear regression models. It is important to note that an insignificant 
estimate of the interaction coefficient neither indicates an insignificant effect nor 
does the sign of the coefficient denote the direction of the effect (Ai and Norton 
2003). To test whether there is indeed no gender gap, we estimate predicted 
probabilities based on Table 3’s Model 4 only varying the gender variable.  
Table 4 presents the predicted probabilities for all three different labour market 
states and all five possible values of the dependent variable. The displayed values 
denote the change in predicted probabilities if the gender of the hypothetical 
respondent is changed (from male to female) and everything else remains equal. The 
95 percent confidence interval is shown in brackets below the change in predicted 
probabilities. The table can be read as follows: In case of labour market insiders 
(column four), the probability of considering job security very important (row six) 
increases by 0.2 percent if the hypothetical individual turns female. However, since 
the confidence interval includes both positive and negative values, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the change in predicted probabilities is not significantly 
different from zero (at the 95 percent level). In fact, there is not one single significant 
change in predicted probabilities displayed in Table 4. As a result, Table 4 does not 
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support our hypothesis concerning an interaction effect between gender and labour 
market status.  
 
          
 Upscales  Outsiders  Insiders 
 ∆pi  ∆pi  ∆pi 
      
P(y = 1 | x) -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0000 
 [-0.0012, 0.0008]  [-0.0010, 0.0006]  [-0.0004, 0.0004] 
      
P(y = 2 | x) -0.0011  -0.0010  -0.0001 
 [-0.0064, 0.0043]  [-0.0052, 0.0031]  [-0.0022, 0.0020] 
      
P(y = 3 | x) -0.0021  -0.0022  -0.0003 
 [-0.0129, 0.0087]  [-0.0111, 0.0066]  [-0.0048. 0.0043] 
      
P(y = 4 | x) -0.0079  -0.0129  -0.0016 
 [-0.0484, 0.0325]  [-0.0639, 0.0380]  [-0.0312, 0.0279] 
      
P(y = 5 | x) 0.0113  0.0164  0.0020 
 [-0.0463, 0.0689]  [-0.0484, 0.0812]  [-0.0345, 0.0385] 
            
      
Table 4: Labour Market Status x Gender: Change in Predicted Probabilities 
Note: Change of predicted probabilities (from male to female) estimated on the basis of Table 3’s Model 4 
using SPost (Long and Freese 2006).  
 
 
Although we do not find a relationship between gender and attitudes concerning 
the importance of job security in choosing a job, we are able to observe significant 
effects of household variables on preferences for job security. More concretely, we 
observe that main contributors to the household income consider job security more 
important in choosing a job than equal contributors and secondary earners. Table 5 
displays the substantive effects, estimated using Table 3’s Model 3. The change in 
predicted probabilities is shown for a hypothetical respondent who changes from an 
equal contributor to a main contributor to the household income, everything else 
remaining equal. As can be seen in row 6 of Table 5, the probability of answering 
that job security is very important in choosing a job increases by more than seven 
percent when the hypothetical respondent is a main contributor to the household 
income. In contrast, the probability of answering that job security is ‘only’ important 
decreases by more than five percent.  
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 Main contributor  
 Reference: equal contributors  
 ∆pi  
   
P(y = 1 | x) -0.0009  
 [-0.0017, -0.0001]  
   
P(y = 2 | x) -0.0049  
 [-0.0086, -0.0012]  
   
P(y = 3 | x) -0.0102  
 [-0.0178, -0.0026]  
   
P(y = 4 | x) -0.0548  
 [-0.0911, -0.0185]  
   
P(y = 5 | x) 0.0708  
 [0.0227, 0.1188]  
      
   
Table 5: Contribution to Household Income: Change in Predicted Probabilities 
Note: Change of predicted probabilities (from equal contributor to main contributor) estimated on the basis of 
Table 3’s Model 3 using SPost (Long and Freese 2006).  
 
 
Similarly, we observe a significant effect of a dummy variable measuring whether 
a respondent is married or lives in a steady relationship (which we use to 
operationalize mobility preferences). As can be seen in Table 6, the probability of 
answering that job security is very important in choosing a job increases by more 
than six percent when the hypothetical respondent is married or lives in a steady 
relationship. In contrast, the probability of answering that job security is ‘only’ 
important decreases by almost five percent.  
 
However, a word of caution is in order. The distinction between different forms 
of contribution to the household income is only meaningful for persons living 
together. Conversely, only persons living together are able to allocate tasks between 
partners, such as one being the main contributor to the household income and the 
other one being the secondary wage earner. Put differently, an interaction effect 
between ‘living together’ and ‘main contributor to the household income’ can be 
expected. As a consequence, we have re-estimated Table 3’s Model 3 incorporating 
an interaction for the dummy variables ‘living together’ and ‘main contributor to the 
household income’ (model not reported).6 
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 Living together  
 ∆pi  
   
P(y = 1 | x) -0.0008  
 [-0.0014, -0.0002]  
   
P(y = 2 | x) -0.0043  
 [-0.0068, -0.0017]  
   
P(y = 3 | x) -0.0089  
 [-0.0140, -0.0039]  
   
P(y = 4 | x) -0.0482  
 [-0.0734, -0.0229]  
   
P(y = 5 | x) 0.0622  
 [0.0292, 0.0951]  
      
   
Table 6: Living Together: Change in Predicted Probabilities 
Note: Change of predicted probabilities (from living alone to living together) estimated on the basis of Table 
3’s Model 3 using SPost (Long and Freese 2006).  
 
 
Table 7 displays the change of predicted probabilities for all four possible 
combinations of ‘living together’ (0/1) and ‘main contributor’ (0/1). As can be seen, 
‘main contributor’ only affects preferences for job security in case of respondents 
living together with their partners, i.e. respondents who are married or in steady 
relationships (column 2). In this case, the probability of answering that job security is 
very important increases by over seven percent (column 2, row 6). In contrast, main 
contributors are not significantly more interested in job security when they are not 
living together with their partners (column 3). Similarly, ‘living together’ only affects 
preferences for job security if these respondents are also main contributors to the 
household income (column 4). In this case, the probability of answering that job 
security is very important increases by over six percent (column 4, row 6). In 
contrast, ‘living together’ does not affect the preferences for job security of 
respondents who are not the main contributors to the household income (column 5).  
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Effect of: 
Main 
contributor   Main contributor  Living together  Living together 
Situation: 
Living 
together  
Not living 
together  
Main 
contributor  
Not main 
contributor 
 ∆pi  ∆pi  ∆pi  ∆pi 
        
P(y = 1|x) -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.0007  -0.0004 
 [-0.0015, -0.0003]  [-0.0011, 0.0007]  [-0.0013, -0.0002]  [-0.0013, 0.0005] 
        
P(y = 2|x) -0.0048  -0.0012  -0.0039  -0.0020 
 [-0.0075, -0.0020]  [-0.0060, 0.0036]  [-0.0063, -0.0015]  [-0.0067, 0.0026] 
        
P(y = 3|x) -0.0101  -0.0025  -0.0084  -0.0043 
 [-0.0157, -0.0045]  [-0.0124, 0.0074]  [-0.0134, -0.0034]  [-0.0140, 0.0055] 
        
P(y = 4|x) -0.0582  -0.0121  -0.0493  -0.0211 
 [-0.0882, -0.0282]  [-0.0590, 0.0347]  [-0.0776, -0.0209]  [-0.0673, 0.0252] 
        
P(y = 5|x) 0.0740  0.0161  0.0623  0.0277 
 [0.0355, 0.1124]  [-0.0463, 0.0785]  [0.0264, 0.0982]  [-0.0337, 0.0892] 
                
        
Table 7: Living Together x Main Contributor: Change in Predicted Probabilities 
Note: Change of predicted probabilities (columns 2 and 3: from not main contributors to main contributors; 
columns 4 and 5: from not living together to living together) estimated using SPost (Long and 
Freese 2006). Model not reported.  
 
 
Aggregate level data and variables 
 
In a second step, we explore the determinants of cross-national differences in 
attitudes concerning the importance of job security in choosing a job. As shown 
above, we can observe two significant determinants of preferences for job security: 
‘living together’ and ‘main contributor to the household income’. In the following, 
we investigate whether the effect of being the main contributor to the household 
income and the effect of living together respectively on the evaluation of job security 
varies systematically across countries. In the theoretical part, we have argued that 
these cross-national differences might co-vary with social policies and policies that 
help reconciling work and family life. In the case of cross-national differences with 
regard to the evaluation of job security by different forms of contribution to the 
household income, we test whether these differences can be explained by policies 
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that help reconcile work and family life (childcare and family benefits) and social 
policies that protect the income of households (unemployment benefits).  
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Austria 9,6 4,1 12,6 65,0 26,6 2,2 0,5 12,6 0,4 0,6 2,6 
Belgium 19,7 38,5 11,7 49,7 25,8 2,2 1,2 14,5 3,4 3,3 2,4 
Denmark 8,4 61,7 11,2 72,9 26,1 1,5 1,9 35,8 2,2 2,7 2,5 
Finland 7,6 22,4 12,8 82,0 24,2 2,0 1,2 10,2 5,6 5,3 4,4 
France 25,1 26,0 5,9 69,4 27,9 3,1 1,2 10,8 2,7 3,3 2,7 
Germany 9,1 9,0 12,8 71,3 26,3 2,3 1,2 13,8 1,7 1,0 1,9 
Great Britain 24,7 25,8 6,8 61,5 20,1 0,7 0,4 6,0 2,7 3,4 3,3 
Greece 4,5 7,0 2,2 42,3 20,6 3,5 0,3 2,8 0,2 -0,5 3,6 
Ireland 24,8 15,0 9,4 69,4 14,4 0,9 1,1 15,0 9,9 8,3 9,0 
Italy . 6,3 7,9 51,3 23,5 2,0 0,5 4,5 3,5 2,1 1,9 
Luxembourg 32,4 14,0 13,2 87,7 20,8 . 0,2 6,5 3,7 1,5 5,5 
Netherlands 17,5 29,5 5,9 68,7 19,7 2,1 1,5 35,0 7,1 3,9 3,7 
Portugal 27,8 23,5 4,8 76,4 19,9 3,7 0,6 10,7 5,7 3,3 3,7 
Spain 30,3 20,7 0,0 75,7 20,0 3,1 0,6 3,3 9,6 11,5 4,0 
Sweden 4,5 39,5 12,1 69,1 28,9 2,2 2,1 26,9 3,8 4,9 3,0 
                        
 
Table 8: Aggregate Level Variables 
Sources: OECD (2007), OECD Tax-Benefit Calculator (accessed 26.6.2009), OECD Social 
Expenditure Database (accessed 10.8.2009), OECD Labour Force Statistics (accessed 
10.8.2009), Penn World Table 6.2 (accessed 10.8.2009) and Armingeon et al. (2008).  
Note: For the calculation of family and unemployment benefits, family benefits have not been considered as 
part of the net income of the average worker. 
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In case of cross-national differences with regard to the effect of living together 
on the evaluation of job security, we test whether these differences can be explained 
by policies that help reconcile work and family life (childcare and family benefits) and 
social policies that reduce mobility costs (active labour market policies). Moreover, 
we control whether these cross-national differences can be explained by the level of 
employment protection, i.e. the regulation of hiring and firing, as we hypothesize that 
preferences for job security reflect preferences for job security regulations.7 Table 8 
displays the aggregate level data and the data sources.  
 
To test these aggregate level relationships, we estimate a hierarchical model in 
two steps. First, we estimate for each country a separate model analogue to Table 3’s 
Model 3. In a second step, we regress the country specific coefficients for the 
variable of interest on the explanatory variables. To adjust for uncertainty in the first 
step, we employ feasible weighted least squares in the aggregate level regressions 
(Jusko and Shively 2005). We further incorporate a control variable for labour market 
risks, that is, a variable reflecting the current state of the labour market. This variable 
is the sum of the z-standardized values of the change of the unemployment rate 
(multiplied by -1), the change of the employment rate and average GDP growth in 
the period 1996 to 2001 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86) in a given country. See Table 8 
for the raw data.  
As noted above, there is likely an interaction effect between ‘main contributor to 
the household income’ and ‘living together’. However, there are only between 294 
(Luxembourg) and 511 (Sweden) observations per country. Moreover, the number of 
respondents living together with a partner and at the same time contributing the 
main part to the household income varies between 126 (Finland) and 249 (Sweden). 
As a result, we present both the models without (Tables 9 and 11) and with the 
interaction effect (Tables 10 and 12). In the latter case, we estimate for each country 
a separate model including an interaction effect between ‘main contributor to the 
household income’ and ‘living together’.8 We then use the country specific change in 
predicted probabilities as the dependent variable in our cross-national regression 
models, for which we use ordinary least squares regression. Again, we control for 
labour market risks. 
 
Aggregate level empirical evidence 
 
Table 9 displays the results of feasible weighted least squares of cross-national 
differences with regard to the evaluation of job security by main contributors to the 
household income as opposed to equal contributors on social policies and policies 
that help reconciling work and family life. We control for labour market risks and 
further add a dummy variable for Great Britain as regression diagnostics have 
identified Great Britain as a particularly influential case (identified using Cook’s D 
after OLS regressions, with Great Britain scoring 0.444, which is considerably bigger 
than 4/n). Given the low number of observations (14 to 15), a slightly less stringent 
significance level could be employed. Nevertheless, as Table 9 shows, no significant 
effects, apart from the dummy variable for the extreme case Great Britain, can be 
observed. Moreover, wald tests of each regression model displayed in Table 9 
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indicate that none adds any explanatory power as compared to an intercept-only 
model.  
 
              
Dependent variable: Main contributor to household income: cross-national differences 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 
       
Childcare fees -0.002 - - - - - 
 (-0.15)      
Childcare enrolment - -0.008 - - - - 
  (-1.21)     
Family benefits - - 0.017 - - - 
   (0.61)    
Unemployment benefits - - - -0.005 - - 
    (-0.44)   
Social expenditure - - - - -0.017 - 
     (-0.44)  
Employment protection 
legislation - - - - - -0.160 
      (-1.02) 
Labour market risks 0.014 0.002 0.010 0.010 -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.29) (0.05) (0.24) (0.23) (-0.29) (-0.16) 
Great Britain (dummy 
variable) -0.972(*) 
-
1.020(*) 
-
0.991(*) -1.060* -1.115* -1.303* 
 (-1.75) (-1.90) (-1.83) (-1.97) (-1.98) (-2.19) 
Constant 0.353 0.541** 0.207 0.679 0.766 0.729(*) 
 (1.50) (2.94) (0.76) (0.93) (0.82) (1.94) 
       
Wald test, chi2 (3) 0.309 0.156 0.247 0.265 0.265 0.186 
N 14 15 15 15 15 14 
              
       
Table 9: Main Contributor to Household Income: Determinants of Cross-National 
Differences 
Notes: Feasible weighted least squares regressions, z-values in parentheses. Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p 
< 0.01, * p < 0.05, (*) p < 0.10. 
 
 
For Table 10, we take the interaction effect between ‘main contributor’ and 
‘living together’ into account. As a dependent variable, we calculate for each country 
separately the change of predicted probabilities when changing from not being main 
contributor to being main contributor to the household income in case of 
respondents living together with their partners. As in case of Table 9, there is only 
little evidence for a systematic aggregate level relationship. Only in Model 16, we are 
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able to observe an adjusted R2 clearly bigger than zero (adj. R2 = 0.216). According to 
Model 16, high levels of employment protection legislation are associated with 
smaller differences between main contributors to the household income and the 
remaining respondents. However, this result should be taken with a grain of salt as a 
similar relationship could not be found in Table 9.  
 
              
Dependent variable: 
Main contributor to household income (when living 
together): cross-national differences 
 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
       
Childcare fees 0.000 - - - - - 
 (0.06)      
Childcare enrolment - -0.001 - - - - 
  (-0.75)     
Family benefits - - 0.008 - - - 
   (1.76)    
Unemployment benefits - - - 0.001 - - 
    (0.39)   
Social expenditure - - - - -0.006 - 
     (-0.82)  
Employment protection 
legislation - - - - - -0.046* 
      (-2.33) 
Labour market risks -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 
 (-0.11) (-0.25) (0.15) (-0.41) (-0.75) (-0.87) 
Constant 0.044 0.075(*) -0.019 0.002 0.184 0.147** 
 (0.89) (2.03) (-0.43) (0.02) (1.14) (3.10) 
       
Adj. R2 -0.181 -0.108 0.0792 -0.145 -0.098 0.216 
N 14 15 15 15 15 14 
              
       
Table 10: Main Contributor to Household Income (when Living Together): 
Determinants of Cross-National Differences 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regressions, t-values in parentheses. Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 
0.01, * p < 0.05, (*) p < 0.10. 
 
 
Turning to the cross-national differences with regard to the attitudes concerning 
the importance of job security in choosing a job of respondents living together as 
opposed to the remaining respondents, Table 11 shows the results of feasible 
weighted least squares regressions of cross-national differences on social policies and 
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policies that help reconciling work and family life using the model specification 
without an interaction effect between ‘main earner’ and ‘living together’. As in Tables 
9 and 10, we again introduce a control for labour market risks and further add a 
dummy variable for Greece as regression diagnostics have identified Greece as a 
particularly influential case (identified using Cook’s D after OLS regressions, with 
Greece scoring 0.451, which is considerably bigger than 4/n).  
 
             
Dependent variable: Living together: cross-national differences 
 
Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Model 
22 
       
Childcare fees 0.021* - - - - - 
 (2.39)      
Childcare enrolment - -0.014** - - - - 
  (-3.02)     
Family benefits - - 
-
0.037(*) - - - 
   (-1.71)    
Employment protection 
legislation - - - 0.073 - - 
    (0.76)   
Active labour market policy - - - - -0.284* - 
     (-2.25)  
Standardized ALMP - - - - - -0.018* 
      (-2.45) 
Labour market risks -0.027 -0.009 -0.023 0.001 -0.005 -0.011 
 (-0.80) (-0.31) (-0.71) (0.03) (-0.15) (-0.36) 
Greece (dummy variable) 
-
0.808(*) -1.321** -1.347** -1.110* -0.127** -1.278** 
 (-1.66) (-2.70) (-2.61) (-2.24) (-2.56) (-2.60) 
Constant -0.112 
0.644**
* 0.614** 0.103 
0.575**
* 
0.545**
* 
 (-0.67) (4.48) (2.87) (0.47) (3.73) (4.07) 
       
Wald test, chi2 (3) 0.0169 0.0031 0.0546 0.1589 0.0208 0.0136 
N 14 15 15 14 15 15 
              
       
Table 11: Living Together: Determinants of Cross-National Differences 
 
Notes: Feasible weighted least squares regressions, z-values in parentheses.  
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, (*) p < 0.10. 
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As Table 11 shows, we can observe several significant relationships. Cross-
national differences increase as a function of childcare fees while they decrease as a 
function of childcare enrolment and family benefits. Moreover, there is a significant 
negative effect of spending on active labour market policies on cross-national 
differences.  
  
             
       
Dependent variable: 
Living together (when main contributor to household 
income): cross-national differences 
 
Model 
23 
Model 
24 
Model 
25 
Model 
26 
Model 
27 
Model 
28 
              
       
Childcare fees 0.002 - - - - - 
 (0.49)      
Childcare enrolment - -0.003* - - - - 
  (-2.41)     
Family benefits - - 0.001 - - - 
   (0.14)    
Employment protection 
legislation - - - -0.034 - - 
    (-1.00)   
Active labour market policies - - - - -0.034 - 
     (-0.74)  
Standardized ALMP - - - - - -0.002 
      (-0.63) 
Labour market risks -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
 (-0.97) (-1.35) (-0.84) (-1.12) (-1.05) (-1.08) 
Greece (country dummy) 0.239(*) -0.323** 
-
0.253(*) 
-
0.214(*) -0.286* -0.283* 
 (-2.13) (-3.64) (-2.04) (-1.93) (-2.65) (-2.61) 
Constant 0.044 0.161** 0.069 0.145(*) 0.112(*) 0.102* 
 (0.68) (0.040) (0.93) (1.89) (2.14) (2.25) 
       
Adj. R2 0.175 0.470 0.192 0.252 0.229 0.219 
N 14 15 15 14 15 15 
              
       
Table 12: Living together (when Main Contributor to Household Income): 
Determinants of Cross-National Differences 
 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regressions, t-values in parentheses.  
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, (*) p < 0.10. 
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However, as Table 12 shows, we should be careful when interpreting these 
findings. For Table 12, the interaction effect between ‘main contributor’ and ‘living 
together’ has been taken into account. The dependent variable, calculated for each 
country separately, corresponds to the change of predicted probabilities when 
changing from living alone to living together in case of respondents who are the 
main contributors to the household income. Using this dependent variable, all 
coefficients, except the coefficients for the variable ‘childcare enrolment’ and the 
dummy variable for the extreme case Greece, cease to be significantly different from 
zero.9 Thus, we are only able to identify one robust aggregate level relationship: 
cross-national differences with regard to the attitudes concerning the importance of 
job security in choosing a job of respondents living together as opposed to the 
remaining respondents decrease as a function of childcare enrolment. However, 
considering the unclear interpretation of this result and potential problems of 
endogeneity, that is, policies explaining attitudes towards related policies, we refrain 
from interpreting this finding in any detail.10  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
In the present paper, we have hypothesized that the insider/outsider theory of 
employment and unemployment suffers from a gender bias. It is based on the 
comparison of full-time employees with permanent contracts to unemployed 
individuals. Moreover, the possibility of not work-related labour market transitions is 
not taken into account. In his seminal work, Rueda (2005, 2007) has advanced the 
insider/outsider theory by incorporating the role of non-standard employment 
relationships, most notably part-time and temporary contracts. In this paper, we 
maintain that this is not enough. Most importantly, the insider/outsider theory in its 
present form does not allow for gender differences.  
We believe that there are very good reasons to expect gender to matter. Firstly, 
on average, women experience more labour market transitions than men. Some of 
these labour market transitions are not job-related but the result biological 
differences (women give birth to children while men do not). Although not all 
women experience more labour market transitions than men, the phenomenon of 
statistical discrimination brings about that all women are treated as if they would 
experience more labour market transitions than men. Because the transition from 
unemployment to employment is more difficult for women than for men, we 
hypothesize that female outsiders are even more critical of labour market institutions 
that complicate their return to an insider position. As a consequence, we expect them 
to express less interest in job security regulations. Conversely, as job security 
regulations strengthen the labour market position of employed women, and since 
women tend to have weaker labour market positions than men, we expect female 
insiders to express more interest in job security than their male counterparts. 
Secondly, the insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployment does 
not incorporate the household situation. In this paper, we hypothesize that the 
household situation – theoretically conceptualized as mobility and responsibility 
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preferences – not only affects preferences for job security, but also that it affects 
women and men differently. The latter is the result of the uneven distribution of paid 
and unpaid labour between the genders.  
In the empirical part, we show that respondents carrying the main responsibility 
for the economic livelihood of the family, the main contributors to the family 
income, consider job security more important in choosing a job than equal 
contributors and secondary wage earners. Moreover, we show that respondents living 
together with a partner are more interested in job security than respondents living 
alone. In contrast, we observe that gender does not – neither as an independent 
variable nor in interaction with labour market status – significantly affect attitudes 
concerning the importance of job security in choosing a job.  
In a second step, we explored whether social policies and policies that help 
reconciling work and family life can explain cross-national differences with regard to, 
on the one hand, cross-national differences between respondents living together and 
respondents living alone and, on the other hand, cross-national differences between 
main contributors to the household income and equal contributors/secondary wage 
earners. The results of the empirical analysis are sobering. We observe no robust 
cross-national co-variations.  
Where do we go from here? We identify two important directions for future 
research and one important qualification of our results. Firstly, we have shown that 
the household situation has an important effect on preferences for job security. 
Theoretically, we conceptualized the household situation as mobility and 
responsibility preferences. However, the theoretical arguments put forward are still 
rather simplistic. A more thorough conceptualization should further take the 
interaction between mobility and responsibility into account. With regard to empirics, 
better data is needed in order to analyze the link between the household situation and 
preferences for job security. Although the Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001) survey 
provides data on both the household situation and preferences for job security, 
sample size complicates the empirical analysis. For instance, there are only 126 
Finnish respondents who simultaneously live together with a partner and contribute 
the main part to the household income.  
Secondly, we still lack an adequate explanation for the ‘odd’ finding that labour 
market outsiders are as interested in job security as labour market insiders. We 
advance two possible explanations for this finding. Firstly, the classification of labour 
market participants into insiders, outsiders, self-employed and upscales is too crude 
and too static. While we are sympathetic to this critique, we do not believe that it can 
explain our surprising results. Most notably, this argument is at odds with our finding 
that a history of unemployment, that is, the experience of unemployment in the last 
five years before the survey was conducted, has no significant effect on preferences 
for job security. Secondly, the long-term interest of eventually obtaining an insider 
position might induce outsiders (and respondents experiencing an above average 
number of labour market transitions) to support job security regulations despite 
short-term disadvantages (long-term rationality). However, with the data at hand, this 
hypothesis cannot be followed up.  
Finally, the presented findings have to be qualified for two important reasons. 
Firstly, we acknowledge that the operationalization of the dependent variable is 
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problematic. We are first and foremost interested in preferences for job security 
regulations. However, the dependent variable only captures preferences for secure 
employment. Although our operationalization follows the literature on the 
determinants of preferences for job security regulations (Rueda 2005, 2007; 
Emmenegger 2009ac), we acknowledge that this operationalization diminishes the 
relevance of our findings. Secondly, due to data availability, we were not able to 
include the unemployed in our analysis. The unemployed are the archetype of labour 
market outsiders. Nevertheless, they are as supportive of job security regulations as 
labour market insiders (Emmenegger 2009a). In the present paper, we were able to 
shed some light on the reasons for the surprisingly high levels of support for job 
security regulations among part-time and temporarily employed respondents. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to do the same for unemployed respondents. 
 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Lucas Leemann and all participants in the panel “Multilevel Approaches to 
the Demand for Welfare Policies” at the 5th ECPR General Conference for very helpful comments 
and suggestions. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. 
 
2 Rueda (2005, 2007) takes the role of non-standard employment contracts into account.  
 
3 Note that the model already distinguishes between labour market outsiders (unemployed, 
temporarily or part-time employed respondents) and non-employed respondents. The latter are 
expected to be more supportive of job security regulations than labour market outsiders (see Figure 2).  
 
4 Due to different institutionalist experiences in the postwar period, significant differences between 
East and West Germany have to be expected (Svallfors 2006: 193). Thus, East and West Germany are 
often treated as two different ‘countries’ in quantitative analyzes of individual level data. In multilevel 
settings, this implies that two different ‘countries’, that is East and West Germany, have the same 
scores on the aggregate level indicators, mostly reflecting formerly West German institutions. We 
avoid this situation by omitting East Germany from the dataset. In the present analysis, Germany only 
refers to West Germany. 
 
5 Admittedly, this dependent variable is far from perfect. Preferences for job security regulations are 
often operationalized using a question on attitudes towards governmental support for declining 
industries to protect jobs (e.g. Algan and Cahuc 2006; Emmenegger 2009ab). This question, however, 
has the drawback of including aspects of industrial policy, which may not necessarily be supported by 
the respondents. Emmenegger (2009b) shows using ISSP 1996 and ISSP 1997 surveys that both 
questions lead to similar results. 
 
6 To simplify the model, we have omitted the dummy variable for secondary wage earners, i.e. we use 
equal contributors and secondary wage earners as reference category.  
 
7 We are certainly aware of the fact that there is no straightforward relationship between individual 
level preferences and aggregate level institutions.  
 
8 However, in order to simplify the model, we have again omitted the dummy variable for secondary 
wage earners, i.e. we use equal contributors and secondary wage earners as reference category. 
9 Again, we control for labour market risks and incorporate a dummy variable for the extreme case 
Greece (identified using Cook’s D, with Greece scoring 0.306, which is clearly bigger than 4/n). 
 
10 Also note that the coefficient of the variable ‘childcare fees’ ceases to be significantly different from 
zero in Model 23 in Table 12. 
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